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NOTES
THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF
1995: DOING AWAY WITH MORE THAN
JUST CRUNCHY PEANUT BUTTER
CINDY CHENt
It is ugly to be punishable, but there is no glory in punishing.
Hence that double system of protection that justice has set up
between itself and the punishment it imposes. Those who carry
out the penalty tend to become an autonomous sector; justice is
relieved of responsibility for it by a bureaucratic concealment of
the penalty itself.1
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PLRA) to curb prisoner filings of frivolous lawsuits. 2 This Act
has increased the erosion of prisoners' rights by making it more
difficult for prisoners to file lawsuits in federal courts to
vindicate their rights.3 This intrusion on prisoners' rights has
not received much attention from the legislature because
t J.D. Candidate, June 2004, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2001,
New York University.
1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 10
(Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed., Pantheon Books 1995) (1978).
2 Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321-66-1321-77 (1996) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); see also 141
CONG. REC. S14627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The
crushing burden of these frivolous suits makes it difficult for the courts to consider
meritorious claims.").
3 See Collin O'Connor Udell, Parading the Saurian Tail: Projection, Jung, and
the Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 731, 768 (2000) (asserting that the PLRA is a clear
attempt at circumventing prisoners' rights).
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prisoners' rights are usually last on the list of priorities for
lawmakers. 4
Most people, not just lawmakers, do not think much of
prisoners. Simply put, prisoners are not popular people. 5  By
definition, a prisoner has committed a wrong that warrants a
term of confinement. 6 Through that confinement, a prisoner
loses essential rights, most notably, his liberty and a degree of
autonomy over the day-to-day decisions in his life.7 A prisoner,
however, does not lose all his rights.8 The retained rights that
are most relevant to the daily well being of a prisoner are those
afforded by the Eighth Amendment. 9  Under the Eighth
Amendment, prisoners retain the right to have basic needs
provided for during their confinement, including adequate
ventilation, sanitation, and hygienic facilities.10 In short, the
4 Wendy Imatani Peloso, Les Miserables: Chain Gangs and the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1461 (1997) (noting that
there is " 'no political downside to getting tough on prisoners' " (quoting Bill
Bergstrom, More Inmates Actually Paying For Their Sins, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 13,
1996, at C8)).
5 Julie M. Riewe, Note, The Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes in
Prisoner Litigation Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 47 DUKE L.J.
117, 117 (1997) (stating that it is a common fact that prisoners are not liked).
6 See generally NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? (1991), for a thorough discourse
on the different goals, ideologies, and rationalization for state-instituted
punishment.
7 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979) (concluding that
imprisonment is equated with the loss of many significant rights); see also
FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 232 ("This 'self-evident' character of the prison, which
we find so difficult to abandon, is based first of all on the simple form of 'deprivation
of liberty.' ").
8 See generally Stephen G. Dormer, Prisoners' Rights: Substantive Rights
Retained by Prisoners, 85 GEO. L.J. 1561, 1561-1615 (1997) (listing the substantive
rights retained by prisoners, including the right of access to courts and the right to
have living conditions, medical care, and disciplinary treatment comport with
Eighth Amendment standards against cruel and unusual punishment during
confinement).
9 See Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights: Congress and
the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1244 (1998) (noting that "the
Eight Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment" is the only
constitutional right that sets an "affirmative standard of care of prisoners"). See
generally U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted").
10 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) ('CThe Amendment also
imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of
confinement... and must 'take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
inmates."' (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984))).
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Eighth Amendment mandates the humane treatment of a
prisoner.11
To safeguard their rights under the Eighth Amendment,
prisoners file 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits.12 These suits often address
almost every aspect of prison life because for prisoners, "eating,
sleeping, dressing, washing, working and playing are all done
under the watchful eye of the State."'13 Through the filing of
such suits, prisoners help to reveal substandard conditions of
confinement, which have included the abuse and neglect of
prisoners by prison officials. 14 Prisoner-initiated litigation, in
sum, is an effective mechanism for revealing, addressing, and
ameliorating constitutional violations. 15 For example, recently
in Hope v. Pelzer,16 the plaintiff-prisoner claimed that Alabama
prison guards violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they
handcuffed him to a hitching post twice and deprived him of
11 See id.; see also Pritchett v. Page, No. 99 C 8174, 2000 WL 1129891, at *9
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2000) (asserting that "longstanding case law has 'clearly
established' that prison officials may not subject prisoners to conditions of
confinement that violate the Constitution").
12 The Civil Rights Act provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any.., person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be [civilly] liable to
the party injured ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996); see William Bennett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study
of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610, 610
(1979) ("Prisoners, like other people, may sue state and local officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, to redress the deprivation of federal constitutional rights.")
Originally, § 1983 only addressed deprivation of constitutional rights by state
officials. Through its decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court expanded § 1983 to include violations by
federal officials. 403 U.S. 388, 392-97 (1971).
13 See Turner, supra note 12, at 611 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 492 (1973)).
14 See, e.g., White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305, 307 (D. N.J. 1998) (describing
the instant claim as a class action suit brought by plaintiff on behalf of all inmates
at a New Jersey correctional facility, "alleging that prison officials engaged in a
pattern of physical abuse, threats, and subjected plaintiffs to a series of
unconstitutional living conditions").
15 See Kristin L. Burns, Return to Hard Time: The Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 31 GA. L. REV. 879, 880 (1997) (citing, for example, Hutto v. Finley, 437
U.S. 678, 682 (1978), where the Supreme Court found Eighth Amendment violations
when "as many as ten or eleven inmates" were being housed indeterminately in
"windowless, eight-by-ten-foot rooms containing merely a source of water and a
toilet that could be flushed only from the outside").
16 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
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bathroom breaks and water.17 To vindicate his rights, while also
revealing unconstitutional treatment of prisoners, he filed § 1983
claims against the prison guards who administered the
punishment.' 8 Prisoner litigation is one way to monitor and
prevent such digressions toward brutality. 19
When proponents of the PLRA urged for its passage, they
did not see prisoner litigation as a method to safeguard
standards of a civilized society.20 Instead, they believed prisoner
lawsuits were frivolous and a waste of resources. 21  PLRA
proponents often cite a case in which an inmate sued the state
because he received a jar of crunchy peanut butter and not the
creamy kind that he had ordered from the prison canteen (the
"Peanut Butter Case") as a classic example of a frivolous
prisoner suit.22  Proponents of the PLRA believed that all
prisoner-brought litigation was as frivolous as the Peanut Butter
Case.23
Congress enacted the PLRA to curb prisoners' alleged abuse
of the federal courts.24 Through the PLRA, Congress changed
17 See id. at 733-35; accord supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
18 See Hope, 536 U.S. at 735.
19 See Burns, supra note 15, at 879 (quoting FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE
HOUSE OF THE DEAD 76 (Constance Garnett trans., 1957) (" 'The degree of
civilization of a society is revealed by entering its prisons.' ").
20 141 CONG. REC. S14626-28 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statements of Sens.
Dole, Reid, Thurman, and Hatch).
21 For example, Attorney General Jay Nixon has stated that prisoners filing too
many unmeritorious suits cost Missouri more than $1 million annually. Nixon and
other Attorneys General have compiled a "top 10" list of ridiculous suits filed by
prisoners, in particular suits filed by Missouri prisoners suing for butter instead of
margarine and for salad bars and brunches on the weekends. See Tim Bryant,
Missouri Prisoners Lose Ruling on Frivolous Suits, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May
8, 1997, at 1OA; see also Ashley Dunn, Flood of Prisoner Rights Suits Brings Effort
to Limit Filings, N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 1994, at Al (discussing suits cited to be
frivolous, including the case of the inmate who sued because he received crunchy
peanut butter instead of the creamy kind).
22 See 141 CONG. REC. S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dole) (including the Peanut Butter Case among the list of frivolous prisoner-brought
lawsuits that inundate the federal dockets and waste legal resources); see also Mark
Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
47 DUKE L.J. 1, 64 (1997) ("[C]onservatives won the battle of sound bites: law suits
focusing on peanut butter sandwiches and premium cable became the central
images rather than lawsuits that attempted to keep cells free of raw sewage.").
23 See Bryant, supra note 21.
24 See 141 CONG. REC. S14626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (noting that the purpose of the PLRA is to fix the problem with the
overabundance of prisoner-brought lawsuits).
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several statutes that govern the filing procedures for prisoner
lawsuits.2" Most notably, the PLRA changed 42 U.S.C. § 1997e,
which governs the exhaustion of institutional grievance
procedures, making it a mandatory pre-condition that prisoners
exhaust all available administrative remedies provided within
his or her prison's grievance procedures before filing a § 1983
action (the "Exhaustion Requirement"). 26
This Note examines the exhaustion requirement under the
PLRA and argues that it does not serve the intended purpose of
easing the federal courts' workload. Rather, the PLRA has
demonstrated the potential to bar meritorious prisoner claims.
Furthermore, this Note advocates making the Exhaustion
Requirement discretionary, rather than mandatory, so that the
intended purpose of the PLRA can be served without barring
meritorious claims. Under guided discretion, judges should be
able to decide whether exhaustion is pragmatic on a case-by-case
basis.
This Note does not argue that all prisoner lawsuits are
meritorious, nor does it argue that the reduction of frivolous
prisoner lawsuits is not a valid goal in light of the current
federal dockets. Rather, this Note asserts that the PLRA's
Exhaustion Requirement, in its present state, does not
effectively achieve these goals without doing a great injustice to
meritorious claims.
As enactment of the PLRA was largely a reactionary
response to the rise of prisoner lawsuits and its impact on the
federal docket, Part I of this Note examines the history and
development of the concept of a prisoner lawsuit. Part II focuses
on the legislative history of the PLRA and the rhetoric behind its
passage. Part III examines how the application of the
exhaustion requirement has not accomplished its intended goal,
25 See Amanda A. Johnson & Megan Geunther, Prisoners' Rights: Procedural
Means of Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 90 GEO. L.J. 2046, 2055-56 (noting
that the enactment of the PLRA "constrain[ed] available relief and impos[ed]
procedural barriers" for the filing of an inmate suit).
26 That provision states:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal Law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1996); see Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 2000)
(recognizing that the PLRA makes exhaustion of administrative remedies a
mandatory precondition for a prisoner-brought suit in a federal court).
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while it may also have barred potentially meritorious claims.
Finally, Part IV describes the proposed solution to the
provision's shortcoming.
I. THE PRISONER LAWSUIT
At common law, a prisoner had no right to bring a lawsuit. 27
Prisoners were considered "slaves of the state," and confinement
was deemed a moment of "civil death."28 Before 1960, prisoners
were not able to sue under § 1983 to remedy prison conditions. 29
The social atmosphere of the 1960s spurred a new judicial
philosophy recognizing prisoners' rights, and courts became more
receptive to prisoners' rights suits. 30 Before that, courts had
traditionally followed the "hands off doctrine," giving great
deference to prison administrators. 31 There were several reasons
for this change in judicial philosophy. Among them was the
Warren Court's repudiation of the right-privilege distinction 32
27 Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the
Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 422 (1993) ("[A]t common law a prisoner
convicted of a felony could not bring suit.").
28 WILLIAM L. SELKE, PRISONS IN CRISIS 28 (1993) ("[U]pon conviction and
sentencing to a term of imprisonment, the inmate lost all rights and was under the
absolute control of correctional authorities.").
29 See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 422 (discussing how the courts did not allow
prisoners to use the Civil Rights Act to sue).
30 For example:
The National Advisory Commission (1973) outlined the four basic areas of
legal action in the prisoners' rights movement. These include (1) the right
to access the courts and (2) First Amendment rights, as well as (3) rights
related to the conditions of confinement and (4) the procedural practices of
prison officials .... Indeed, the courts have come to play a role in the
exasperating field of prison administration.
See SELKE, supra note 28, at 28.
The final reason the federal courts became more active in prisoner suits
was that judges could no longer ignore the appalling condition of penal
institutions in some states. Courts, mostly in the south, found that
conditions in state prisons had become clear violations of the Eighth
Amendment. In Florida, the district court found that prison conditions
"endanger[ed] the very lives of the inmates" due to severe overcrowding
and the deprivation of minimally adequate health care. The system
exemplified "blatant deprivations of the [plaintiffs'] constitutional rights."
See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 424 (quoting Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp.
20, 31, 34 (M.D. Fla. 1975), vacated on other grounds 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976)
(en banc), rev'd, 430 U.S. 325 (1977)).
31 See SELKE, supra note 28, at 28; see also Eisenberg supra note 27, at 422.
32 The right-privilege distinction supported the withholding of benefits that
were denominated as privileges. Because a prisoner was entitled to nothing,
everything was designated as a privilege, which did not lead to a constitutional
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and the horrific conditions of many prisons.33 These factors all
eased the way for a prisoner to bring suit under § 1983. Once
the floodgates were opened to prisoner litigation, it came in
waves.
34
II. THE PLRA
Congress enacted the PLRA to deal with the rise of prisoner
litigation in federal courts. 35 Admittedly, the number of lawsuits
filed by prisoners is not low. In 2000, both state and federal
prison inmates filed approximately 58,257 petitions in United
States district courts,36 reflecting a steady increase in the
number of lawsuits filed by state and federal prisoners in federal
courts. 37 PLRA proponents relied heavily on the rising number
of prisoner-brought lawsuits to rally support its passage.38
A. Legislative History
Despite the PLRA's impact on over one million prisoners,
there is scant legislative history behind its enactment. 39
Congress passed the PLRA as a rider to the Omnibus
Consolidated Rescission and Appropriations Act of 1996. 40 The
debate and legislative processes leading to the passage of the
PLRA were hasty, one-sided, and did not give much thought to
the possible ramifications on prisoners' constitutional rights.
issue. See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 423-24.
33 See id. at 424 (discussing the "appalling condition of penal institutions" in
many southern states).
34 For example:
The combination of increased judicial activism, abrogation of long held
legal doctrine, and the obviously deplorable conditions of many state penal
institutions opened the door to prisoners seeking legal redress through
section 1983 actions. The problem was that, once begun, it became difficult
to stem the tide of such lawsuits.
See id. at 425.
35 See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1558-60
(2003).
36 See JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON PETITIONS FILED IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980-2000 (2002), available at http:H/www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs /pub/pdf/ppfusdO0.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
37 See id.
38 141 CONG. REC. S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(asserting that there was an "alarming explosion" in the number of prisoner
lawsuits).
39 See Riewe, supra note 5, at 119 (arguing that despite the broad scope of the
Act, the PLRA was the subject of a single Judiciary Committee Hearing).
4 See id.
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After only one week of debate, the House passed its version on
July 26, 1995.41 Similarly, the Senate debated the legislation for
a mere five days before approving it.42 The bare legislative
history clearly shows that there was "hardly the type of thorough
review that a measure of this scope deserve[d]."43
B. The Rhetoric Behind the PLRA
In support of the enactment of the PLRA, its proponents
claimed that the federal courts were seriously burdened by
overly litigious prisoners with frivolous suits. 44 Senator Bob
Dole, a PLRA proponent, described the increased prisoner filings
as an "alarming explosion." 45  Senator Dole attributed the
increase in prison litigation to the alleged litigious nature of
prisoners when he stated, "[P]risoners will now 'litigate at the
drop of a hat.' "46 Senator Dole failed, however, to address the
drastic increase in prison population in the United States that
accompanied the increase in prisoner filings when assessing the
litigious nature of prisoners.47 Moreover, Senator Dole failed to
attribute the rise in prisoner-lawsuits to anything other than the
mere litigious nature of prisoners. 48
The PLRA's proponents further trivialized the prisoner
lawsuits when they declared that filing lawsuits has become a
"recreational activity for long-term residents of our prisons."49
Senator Hatch, another PLRA proponent, asserted that prisoner
lawsuits were frivolous because "only a scant 3.1 percent have
enough merit to reach trial."50 Senator Hatch framed the merits
41 Jennifer Winslow, The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury
Requirement Bars Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant To?, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1655,
1659 (2002) (noting the brevity of the legislative process for the PLRA).
42 Id. at 1659-60.
43 See 142 CONG. REC. S2296 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (criticizing the fact that the PLRA was the subject of a single hearing in
the Judiciary Committee).
44 See id. (stating that the PLRA's proponents view the legislation as "an
attempt to reduce frivolous prisoner litigation").
45 141 CONG. REC. 814413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
46 See 141 CONG. REC. S7524 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(quoting Chief Justice William Rehnquist).
47 See SCALIA, supra note 36.
48 See 141 CONG. REC. 87524 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(asserting that frivolous claims by prisoners are simply the result of their litigious
nature).
49 See 141 CONG. REC. S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
50 See 141 CONG. REC. S18136 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen.
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of a case solely on its ability to reach the trial stage. 51 According
to some commentators, however, a case is successful, or
possesses merit, if "(1) the plaintiff wins after trial, (2) the
parties settle their dispute, (3) the court grants a stipulated
dismissal, or (4) the plaintiff dismisses the case voluntarily."52
Whether a case goes to trial is not, and should not be, the
dispositive factor of the underlying merits of a case.
PLRA proponents further argue that prisoner-brought
litigation poses a huge financial burden on the legal system.53
According to Senator Abraham, another supporter of the PLRA,
"[t]hirty-three States have estimated that they spend at least
$54.5 million annually combined on these lawsuits. The
National Association of Attorneys General has extrapolated that
number to conclude that the annual costs for all of these States
are approximately $81 million a year to battle" these cases.54
The cases that Senator Abraham referred to included the Peanut
Butter Case, an inmate suing because he was forced to listen to
his unit manager's music, an inmate suing because his ice cream
had melted, and an inmate suing because he was served cake
that was "hacked up" for dinner. 55 Other PLRA proponents also
listed cases that they deemed to be absurd, such as an inmate
who demanded that he receive Reebok or L.A. Gear brand shoes
instead of Converse, 56 an inmate who sued because his jeans did
not fit properly, and an inmate who sued because he received
shoes that were a size too large.5 7 PLRA proponents deemed
these cases, and their characterization of these cases, to be the
sole prototype of prisoner litigation. Much of the PLRA's
legislative history is comprised of proponents listing similar
Hatch).
51 See James E. Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act: A "Not Exactly," Equal Protection Analysis, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 105,
144 (2000) (questioning whether Senator Hatch's standard for merit is correct).
52 See id. (quoting Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 681 (1987)).
53 See Eugene J. Kuzinski, Note, The End of the Prison Law Firm?: Frivolous
Inmate Litigation, Judicial Oversight, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
29 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 368 (1998) ("The result of these lawsuits has been to burden
the federal court system and increase costs of administration.").
5 142 CONG. REC. S3703 (Apr. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
55 Id.
56 See 141 CONG. REC. S14627 (Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (citing
claims which he generalizes as typical prisoner-brought litigation).
57 See id. (statement of Sen. Reid) (generalizing these claims to be typical
prisoner brought litigation).
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cases, and harping merely on the frivolity and abundance of such
cases.
58
By merely advancing the view that prisoners are overly
litigious and bring frivolous suits, PLRA proponents do a great
disservice to prisoner litigation, which has undeniably helped to
ameliorate prison conditions and to curb abuse of prisoners by
exposing the problems that exist in prisons. 59 There are many
legitimate cases not mentioned by PLRA proponents, including a
case where guards at a Virginia state prison fired rubber pellets
from a twelve-gauge shotgun on three separate occasions and
severely wounded an inmate who, as a result, required
hospitalization to remove the pellets from his face. 60 Another
incident involved a jail guard that beat an inmate so severely
that he was paralyzed for a year before dying from such
injuries. 61  These cases are merely a few examples of the
numerous cases revealing the dire conditions of our nation's
prison system, but they were never mentioned during the debate
over the PLRA.62
Moreover, prisoner lawsuits may not expend as many
resources as claimed by PLRA proponents. Some prisoner
advocates and scholars believe that the alleged burden caused by
prisoner lawsuits is an exaggeration and that the so-called
problem with excessive suits brought by prisoners is merely a
myth. 63 According to these commentators, the alleged burden is
exaggerated because frivolous and unmeritorious suits can be
58 See, e.g., id. at S14626-29; 142 CONG. REC. S10576-78 (Sept. 16, 1996).
59 See Kuzinski, supra note 53, at 363-64 (stating that prisoner lawsuits are
necessary for the improvement of prison conditions, and often help to ameliorate
such conditions and improve inmate treatment); see also Robertson, supra note 51,
at 112 (noting that the net result of prisoner suits filed under § 1983 over the past
two decades has been an improvement in jail and prison facilities).
60 Frank Green, 7 Fighting Inmates Fired on, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr.
7, 1999, at B1. For an overview of the abuse of prisoners by prison officials see Ann
H. Mathews, The Inapplicability of the Prison Litgation Reform Act to Prisoner
Claims of Excessive Force, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 536 (2002), which provides an in-depth
discussion on the types of abuse evident in penal institutions.
61 Bill Murphy, Suit Alleges Guard Beat up Prisoner, HOUSTON CHRON., June
17, 2000, at A41.
62 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (referring to the debates on
the Senate floor where various senators listed those cases that they felt were overly
frivolous).
63 See Dunn, supra note 21.
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dismissed early in the process, and, therefore, they actually
consume very little time and resources. 64
Contrary to the belief of PLRA proponents, some
commentators give other reasons, besides the litigious prisoner,
for the rise in the number of prisoner lawsuits. These
commentators believe that the increase in prisoner lawsuits may
be symptomatic of deteriorating prison conditions, rather than
prisoners' propensity for litigation. 65  According to Erwin
Chemerinsky, a constitutional law professor at the University of
Southern California, the number of prisoner lawsuits
"underscores a grim reality of modern prison life: too many
inmates, too few cells and too little attention."66  In the past
twenty years, the prison population, accounting for both state
and federal prisoners, has risen from 329,821 to 1,381,892.67
Due to the rapid growth in the prison population and a slower
increase in the number of cells, prisons now hold "a third more
prisoners than they were designed to hold."68 The insufficiency
of prison space, according to Professor Chemerinsky, provides
one explanation for the rise in prison suits. The lawsuits are an
extension of "overcrowding and deterioration that is only
growing worse."69
Prisoner lawsuits may not be as frivolous as described by
PLRA proponents. Rather the frivolity may simply be a
mischaracterization, or misunderstanding of the cases they
cite. 70 Judge Jon 0. Newman of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit was concerned with the
mischaracterizations of prisoner cases by overzealous state
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 SCALIA, supra note 36, at 4 tbl. 3 (representing federal and state prison
populations from 1980-2000).
68 Dunn, supra note 21.
69 Id. One author, who conducted a study for the Harvard Law School Center
for Criminal Justice, concluded:
Prison conditions and rules undoubtedly affect the volume of prisoner
litigation. As a general proposition, prisoners who live in spacious, clean
facilities with good recreational or educational programs and few
restrictive behavioral rules are less likely to file federal lawsuits than
those who inhabit decrepit and unsanitary buildings, have no programs,
and are subject to tyrannical guards and oppressive rules.
Turner, supra note 12, at 628.
70 See Jon 0. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in
Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520-22 (1996).
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attorneys' general and decided to look into the underlying facts
of the most cited cases. He concluded that some of the most
widely cited cases have merit and were just simply
mischaracterized. 71 To start, the Peanut Butter Case, according
to Judge Newman, was not about getting the wrong kind of
peanut butter but about charging a prisoner for something that
he never received. 72 This is diametrically different from the
characterization presented by PLRA proponents. During the
brief debate prior to the PLRA's passage, its supporters poked
fun at another case, describing how prisoners allegedly sued over
the lack of a salad bar, to further drive home the point that
prisoner lawsuits were a waste of resources.73 This particular
case, according to Judge Newman, was not about getting a salad
bar, but about dangerously unhealthy prison conditions.7 4 Judge
Newman's reassessment of the cases illustrates that the frivolity
of some cases may simply be misstated.
C. Deconstructing Frivolity
The type of rhetoric espoused by PLRA proponents was
subject to criticism even before the enactment of the PLRA.
According to Jim Thomas, writing six years before the enactment
of the PLRA,
In denigrating prisoner suits, critics tend to use such terms as
'litigation explosion," "frivolous suits," "abuse of courts," or
"crowding out legitimate claims." Such a vocabulary provides
an account-generating mechanism that "explains" a state of
affairs that needs "attending to." Account-generating rhetoric
tends to replace data, and arguments against prisoner suits are
packaged in ways that distort rather than illuminate the
nature and processes of prisoner grievances. 75
71 See id. (expounding on three cases which were deemed frivolous by the
attorneys general and yet had merit when the court documents were reviewed
carefully).
72 See id. at 521-22.
73 See 141 CONG. REC. S14628 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Reid) (including the case of the Missouri inmate who sued "because the prison did
not have salad bars and brunches on weekends").
74 See Newman, supra note 70, at 521; see also Changing the Rules: Prison
Officials and Legislators Mount an All-Out War Against Prisoners' Right to Legal
Access ("Health and sanitary issues often get little attention in prisons because of
the public perception that sick prisoners get what they deserve."), at
http://www.prisonactivist.org/crisis/plra-update.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2003).
7 See Jim Thomas, The "Reality" of Prisoner Litigation: Repackaging the Data,
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The PLRA proponents' mischaracterization of cases distorts
the reality of prisoner litigation. The reality is not that all
prisoner lawsuits are meritorious, but merely that not all are
without merit. Moreover, during the period when prisoners
increased filings of lawsuits, there were cases that signified real
abuse and not the frivolity cited by PLRA proponents. 76
Immediately before the passage of the PLRA, female inmates
filed a § 1983 suit alleging sexual abuse by prison staff.77 PLRA
proponents did not mention this case, or any case similar to it,
when describing prisoner litigation.
A critical assumption "underlying much of the jurisprudence
on prisoner civil rights litigation is that prisoners have the
ability to communicate their claim to the federal court."78 The
fact that most prisoner litigants appear pro se, may contribute to
the view that prisoner suits are frivolous. 79 Even though the
Supreme Court has established a more liberal standard for pro
se litigants, it has been assumed that a prisoner possesses the
ability to draft a complaint, which would "allow [a] district court
to cull out the frivolous claims."80 In reality, a prisoner may not
possess such ability because "[p]risoners are not of average
intelligence."81 A great deal of prisoners do not have adequate
schooling, have learning disabilities, and are "functionally
illiterate."8 2 It is not easy for a prisoner to simply draft up a
complaint that would communicate the extent of his injuries so
that they represent a cognizable legal claim.
15 New ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 27, 29 (1989) (footnote omitted).
76 See Robertson, supra note 51, at 142.
77 See Women Prisoners v. Dist. of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 639-40 (D.D.C.
1994) (describing, among other constitutional violations, a pattern of forcible rape,
sodomy, and sexual abuse of female prisoners by prison staff members).
78 See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 441.
79 See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996: Hearing on S.2838 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (testimony of Sarah Vandenbraak,
Former lead counsel for the Philadelphia District Attorney, Wednesday, September
25, 1996) ("In 1994 prisoners filed over 58,000 lawsuits across the United States,
with ninety-six percent of those lawsuits filed pro se.").
8o See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 442.
81 Id.
82 See id. ("Seventy percent of prison and jail inmates have not completed high
school; 40% have learning disabilities; and 75% read at or below the eighth grade
level. In 1982, a federal court found that half of the prisoners in Florida prisons
were functionally illiterate and 22% were borderline mentally retarded.") (footnotes
omitted).
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Furthermore, the frivolity of prisoner lawsuits may be
examined through the wrong paradigm. Because the prisoner's
world is contained within the parameters of four walls, the
prisoner's definition of frivolous is distinctly different from that
of a non-prisoner. Accordingly, "[w]hat to most people would be
a very insignificant [matter] becomes, because of the nature of
prison life, a matter of real concern to the inmate."8 3  To
determine frivolity based on the non-prisoner's paradigm of
values is mistaken because a non-prisoner's values cannot reflect
the reality of prison life.8 4 For instance, PLRA proponents
thought the Peanut Butter Case was frivolous because they saw
no worth in such mundane things like getting the right kind of
peanut butter. To PLRA proponents who do not live in a world
severely limited in resources, it may be trivial, but to a prisoner
with limited resources, it may mean almost everything.8 5
The increase in the number of lawsuits brought by prisoners
may also be attributable to recent changes in the federal and
state sentencing guidelines.8 6  In recent years, the federal
government and several states have adopted determinate
sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentences and have
eliminated parole.8 7  These changes have and will further
increase the number of defendants sentenced to prison and
increase the length of incarceration. Based on the recent
changes in the sentencing scheme, "the number of persons
confined will continue to grow, with an expected increase in the
number of civil rights actions filed by such persons."88
83 See id. at 438-39 (quoting TENTATIVE REPORT, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES
FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 12 (Oct. 6,
1975)).
84 Id. at 439 ("The rules vary from institution to institution, even within the
same system. The rules can be picayune and not uniformly followed. The prison
deals so pervasively with the inmates' lives that there are many ways in which
disputes may arise.").
85 See Newman, supra note 70, at 522 (noting that the frivolity associated with
the Peanut Butter case may be wrong).
86 See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 435 (suggesting that the increased volume of
prisoner lawsuits may be attributable to the change from indeterminate sentencing
to determinate sentencing).
87 See id. (noting that as the crime rate increased over the last two decades,
legislators concluded that indeterminate sentencing was not working).
88 Id. at 436.
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III. IS MANDATORY EXHAUSTION OF PRISONER CLAIMS A
SOLUTION?
In addition to its short legislative history and erroneous
underlying assumptions about the nature of prisoner litigation,
the PLRA implemented several major changes to filing
procedures for prisoner lawsuits. First, an inmate may not
proceed in forma pauperis without a showing of an "imminent
danger of serious physical injury."8 9 Even then, the inmate's suit
may be dismissed if the inmate has previously had three suits
dismissed for either frivolity, maliciousness, or failure to state a
claim.90  Second, the PLRA limits the time allowed for
prospective relief to two years. 91 Third, the PLRA limits the
recovery for psychological injury by requiring a showing of
physical injury.92 Finally, for an inmate to proceed in federal
court, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) mandates that all available
administrative remedies be fully exhausted. 93
A. The Exhaustion Requirement
The PLRA revised 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to make exhaustion of
administrative remedies mandatory.94 Courts have interpreted
this provision as a mandatory precondition to bringing suit in
federal court.95  The exhaustion of administrative remedies
entails that a prisoner litigant must first process his claims
through all of the institutional grievance procedures before
bringing a suit in federal court. 96 The supporting rationale
89 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000).
90 Id.
91 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1) (2000)..
92 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2000).
93 Id. § 1997e(a).
94 See PLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 802, § 7(a), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-77
(1996).
95 See, e.g., Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 501 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) ("we note,
however, that, while it is true we have concluded § 1997e does not impose a
jurisdictional bar to federal jurisdiction, we have also concluded that the obligation
to exhaust administrative remedies before resort to federal court is a mandatory
one.").
96 See id.; see also Casanova v. Dubois, 289 F.3d 142, 146 (1st Cir. 2002). The
court in Casanova remarked:
Although this is an issue of first impression in this circuit, all federal
appellate courts that have considered the question have rejected this
jurisdictional argument... "we now hold, as has every circuit to have
considered the matter, that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement simply
governs the timing of the action and does not contain the type of sweeping
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behind the provision is that it provides prisoners a faster method
of obtaining relief, and if the prisoner receives relief through this
method, it minimizes litigation. 97
B. The Exhaustion Requirement Has Not Lightened the Federal
Workload
The exhaustion requirement has not reduced litigation, but
rather has generated more litigation interpretting its
application. In addition, the mandatory exhaustion requirement
has not significantly improved judicial efficiency, and in some
areas, it may have actually impeded judicial efficiency.
Furthermore, the minimal benefit derived from its enactment is
outweighed by the fact that it potentially bars meritorious claims
from ever being adjudicated. This result is especially troubling
in light of the expansive interpretation afforded the exhaustion
requirement in recent Supreme Court decisions. 98 In Porter v.
Nussle,99 the Supreme Court expanded the application of the
PLRA so that the exhaustion requirement applied not only to
general prison conditions but also to isolated incidents of
excessive force. 100 In Booth v. Churner,'10 the Supreme Court
reinforced the mandatory nature of the exhaustion requirement
by necessitating that the prisoner exhaust all administrative
remedies regardless of whether the damages sought are actually
available through the institution's grievance procedures. 102
Consequently, the exhaustion requirement has had and will
and direct language that would indicate a jurisdictional bar rather than a
mere codification of administrative exhaustion requirements."
Id. (quoting Ali v. Dist. of Columbia, 278 F.3d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (alteration in
original).
97 See Kuzinski, supra note 53, at 381 (noting that institutional grievance
procedures provide "immediate and less expensive" resolution of prisoner claims).
98 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Barrier to Entry, Recent Rulings Leave Potential
Plaintiffs with Valid Claims Out in the Cold (2002) ("[T]he Supreme Court is closing
the courthouse doors. Many with meritorious claims never will have them heard.
Illegal behavior will go unremedied and undeterred."), available at http://www.nsclc
.org/federalrights/dailyjourn03O2.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2003).
99 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
100 Id. at 532 (holding that the exhaustion requirement applied to "all inmate
suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular
episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong").
101 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
102 Id. at 741 n.6 (holding that "Congress has provided in § 1997e(a) that an
inmate must exhaust [all administrative remedies] irrespective of the forms of relief
sought and offered through administrative avenues").
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have a broader effect on prisoners' rights than it did during its
initial enactment.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Porter, courts were
divided over whether the exhaustion requirement applied to
lawsuits involving isolated instances that violated the Eighth
Amendment's ban on excess force. Circuit courts were split into
two camps: some held that the exhaustion requirement did apply
to isolated incidents;103 while others held that it did not apply to
such incidents. 10 4 For those circuits that did not speak to the
issue, there were intra-circuit splits, such as within the Second
Circuit, where some of the district courts held that the
exhaustion requirement did apply to isolated instances of
excessive force,10 5 while others concluded that it did not apply.10 6
When this issue finally reached the Second Circuit, the court
held in Nussle v. Willette10 7 that the exhaustion requirement
under the PLRA only applied to suits regarding general
conditions of prison life and not to isolated incidents of
constitutional violations.108 The Supreme Court disagreed with
103 See, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293-98 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding
that excessive force claims are actions "brought with respect to prison conditions"
under § 1997e(a)); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 643-44 (6th Cir. 1999)
(concluding the same).
104 See, e.g., Baskerville v. Goord, No. 97 CIV. 6413(BSJ), 1998 WL 778396, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1998) (holding that the exhaustion requirement "does not apply
to allegations of excessive force or assault by prison officials"); White v. Fauver, 19
F. Supp. 2d 305, 313-15 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding that the exhaustion requirement
"does not apply to allegations of excessive use of physical force").
105 See, e.g., Cuoco v. United States Bureau of Prisons, No. 98 CIV. 9009(WHP),
2000 WL 347155, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2000) (discussing how the exhaustion
requirement does apply to excessive force claims); Castillo v. Buday, 85 F. Supp. 2d
309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that "excessive force claims must be
administratively exhausted"); Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884,
888-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (describing other courts' agruments for why the exhaustion
requirement might not apply but finding them unpersuasive).
106 See, e.g., Tolliver v. Wilson, No. 99 CIV. 9555(JGK), 2000 WL 1154311, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000) (concluding that "prison conditions" did not encompass
particular incidents of assault or use of excessive force); Giannattasio v. Artuz, No.
97 CIV. 7606 RP KNF), 2000 WL 335242, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2000)
(explaining why the PLRA does not apply); Royster v. United States, No. 98 Civ.
4109, 1999 WL 1567734, *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1999) (deciding that the
exhaustion requirement did not apply to the claim); Wright v. Dee, 54 F. Supp. 2d
199, 205-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that inmates do not need to exhaust remedies
with an excessive force claim); see also Peddle v. Sawyer, 64 F. Supp. 2d 12, 15-16
(D. Conn. 1999); Carter v. Kiernan, No. 98 Civ. 2664 (JGK), 1999 WL 14014, at *2-5
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1999); Baskerville, 1998 WL 778396, at *2-5.
107 224 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2000).
108 Id. at 97. Ronald Nussle was a prisoner who sued the Connecticut
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the Second Circuit and overruled Willette in Porter v. Nussle, 0 9
holding that the exhaustion requirement applied to all inmate
suits about prison life, regardless of "whether they involve
general circumstances or particular episodes." 110 This decision
made it mandatory for all prisoner lawsuits to pass this initial
threshold of filing administrative claims with their institutions,
and in effect expanded the reach of the exhaustion requirement.
When Congress implemented the PLRA, it failed to define
the term "administrative remedies ... available" within the
statute, and it did not provide legislative history to guide courts
in interpreting this term.'11 This omission prompted a great deal
of litigation to determine its definition. The importance of the
term is clear because whether or not an inmate is required to
fulfill the exhaustion requirement hinges on the precise
statutory phrase "administrative remedies ... available." As a
result of congressional silence, the issue that divided the circuits
was whether a prison litigant needed to exhaust the
administrative remedies provided by an institution if such
procedures did not provide the specific relief sought, in
particular, money damages.112
Prior to the resolution of the issue in Booth v. Churner, the
Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits held that exhaustion was
still required even if the procedures did not provide the relief
requested by the prisoner litigant.1 13 The Fifth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits concluded the opposite. 114 This issue divided the
Department of Corrections over an incident arising on June 15, 1996. Id. Nussle
claimed that on that date correction officers Willette and Porter entered his cell and
proceeded to beat him without justification. Id. The correction officers allegedly beat
Nussle to the point where he lost control of his bowels and sustained a series of
physical injuries. Id.
109 534 U.S. 516, 530-32 (2002).
110 Id. at 532.
111 See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737-39 (2001) (discussing the possible
intent of Congress for the phrase "administrative remedies ... available").
112 See Willette, 224 F.3d at 100 n.5 (listing cases from different circuits and
noting how courts divided).
113 See, e.g., Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71-73 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that
exhaustion was required even if it did not provide for the specific relief requested);
Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that exhaustion
was required); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325-27 (11th Cir. 1998)
(concluding the same).
114 See, e.g., Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Exhaustion
of administrative remedies under section 1997e(a) is not required if a prisoner's
section 1983 claim seeks only money damages and if the correctional facility's
administrative grievance process does not allow for such an award."); Whitley v.
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district courts within the Seventh Circuit.115 The Supreme Court
in Booth resolved the split and held that the exhaustion
requirement also applied in situations when the institutional
grievance procedures do not specifically provide for the relief
sought. 116 This result highlights the ministerial nature of the
exhaustion requirement. Although it may be clear from the
outset that exhaustion will not remedy the inmate's injuries, the
inmate would still have to undergo the procedural hurdles set in
place by the exhaustion requirement.
The Supreme Court's holdings in Porter and Booth expanded
the application of the exhaustion requirement to every inmate
suit regarding prison life, regardless of the form of relief
sought.117 Because of the expansive reach of the exhaustion
requirement, it is important that the provision be effective and
not produce the undesired consequence of barring potentially
meritorious claims. Congress enacted the exhaustion
requirement as a procedural filter for frivolous prisoner claims
and not as an impediment for all prisoner claims. 18 Therefore,
the intended purpose of the exhaustion requirement must be
juxtaposed with its effect to see whether it has served its
purpose, as well as whether the gains from the procedural
barrier outweighs the negative ramifications.
The crux of the PLRA proponents' argument is that frivolous
lawsuits are a huge burden on society because they waste
valuable judicial and legal resources.11 9 Despite the goals of the
Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 886-87 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Congress did not intend to require the
exhaustion of unavailable remedies."); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1266-67
(10th Cir. 1997) (allowing a futility exception and required exhaustion only when a
remedy was actually available).
115 See Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733-34 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
exhaustion is required); cf. Perez v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir.
1999) (Easterbrook, J.) ("It is possible to imagine cases in which the harm is done
and no further administrative action could supply any 'remedy.' ").
116 532 U.S. at 740-41 (2001) (holding that "Congress has mandated exhaustion
[of administrative remedies] ... regardless of the relief offered through
administrative procedures").
117 See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Booth, 532 U.S. at 740-41.
118 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S14627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) ("Indeed, I do not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate
claims. This legislation will not prevent those claims from being raised. The
legislation will, however, go far in preventing inmates from abusing the Federal
judicial system.").
119 See id. ("It is time to stop this ridiculous waste of taxpayers' money. The
huge costs imposed on State governments to defend against these meritless suits is
another kind of crime committed against law-abiding citizens."); see also 141 CONG.
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PLRA, the exhaustion requirement has actually impeded judicial
efficiency rather than promoting it. One of the consequences of
its mandatory nature is that it wastes judicial resources because
it requires an inquiry into the exhaustion requirements when
the case could have already been disposed of on its merits. 120
Another problem is that it wastes judicial resources by requiring
the dismissal and subsequent re-filing of a case, provided the
exhaustion requirements are satisfied during the pending suit. 121
Moreover, the exhaustion requirement can delay a time-sensitive
claim of a constitutional violation, such as where the relief
requested is an injunction against prison officials.
The main purpose of the PLRA, as carried out by the
exhaustion requirement, is to lower the number of frivolous
prisoner lawsuits filed in federal court.122 The exhaustion
requirement, however, has not ameliorated the congested federal
dockets. To the contrary, the exhaustion requirement may have
complicated ordinary proceedings even more, resulting in the
increased expenditure of more judicial resources. Take for
example Rodriguez v. Ghoslaw.123  After the district court
granted summary judgment on the merits to the defendant
corrections officers and prison officials in a § 1983 suit brought
by a New York State prisoner, the Second Circuit remanded the
case for an additional inquiry into exhaustion. 24 In Rodriguez,
not only did the exhaustion inquiry create additional work for
the judiciary, but "[i]f [the] plaintiff failed to exhaust, the
resulting dismissal would be without prejudice to his re-filing
this meritless claim after exhausting the grievance
procedures."'' 25  A dismissal without prejudice entitles the
REC. S14628 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Reid) ("But, basically,
without going into a lot of detail, it would stop this kind of foolishness. This
foolishness costs tens of millions of dollars throughout the States. The taxpayers
finance this litigation."); 141 CONG. REC. S7524 (daily ed. May 5, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Dole ) ("Frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners tie up the courts, waste
valuable judicial and legal resources, and affect the quality of justice enjoyed by the
law-abiding population... . The bottom line is that prisons should be prisons, not
law firms.").
120 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ghoslaw, No. 98 CIV. 4658(GEL), 2002 WL 1424586,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002).
121 See id.
122 See supra note 119.
123 No. 98 CIV. 4658 (GEL), 2002 WL 1424586 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 28, 2002).
124 Id. at * 1.
125 Id. at *2.
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plaintiff to re-file the same claim, and therefore, requires the
district court to decide the same case twice when it had already
decided that the case lacked merit. 126 Not only does this result
wreak havoc on an already congested docket, it also counters the
very objective of the PLRA-to reduce the waste of judicial and
legal resources.
Hicks v. Monteiro127 is another example of where the
exhaustion requirement works contrary to the stated goals of the
PLRA. In Hicks, the only effect of the exhaustion requirement
was to impede a meritorious claim brought by a prison litigant
from proceeding in federal court. Hicks, the plaintiff, was a
prisoner at Salinas Valley State Prison who filed a pro se
complaint alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA), codified as 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq.' 28 Hicks
alleged that he had a severe leg injury, which required the use of
a walking stick or wheel chair, but prison officials would provide
him with neither and did not install rails in the showers or
cell. 129 Hicks alleged that because the prison officials did not
provide him with the requested facilities, he fell stepping out of
the shower and injured himself.1 30 Judge Walker, writing for the
Northern District of California, dismissed Hicks's case despite
noting that the allegations stated a cognizable claim under
§ 1983 and the ADA because Hicks failed to exhaust fully the
available administrative remedies of the prison prior to filing the
federal claim as mandated under the PLRA. 131 Hicks had fully
exhausted the administrative remedies only after initiating his
126 The Rodriguez Court went on to elaborate on the absurdity of the outcome
when it stated:
Defendant could have chosen to expressly waive the non-exhaustion issue
and move instead for restoration of the summary judgment in his favor on
the merits. Instead, he seeks a dismissal without prejudice. Under the
PLRA, he is entitled to that remedy. Accordingly, the plaintiffs claim
against defendant Ghoslaw is dismissed without prejudice to future
litigation on the same cause of action after exhaustion of any available
administrative remedies.
Id. at *3.
127 No. C 00-2254VRW(PR), 2002 WL 654086 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2002).
128 Id. at *1.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at*1, 2.
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federal claim, but this did not fit within the statutory definition
of precondition under the exhaustion requirement. 132
Ultimately, Hicks was denied relief through the institutional
grievance procedures too late, and therefore, his federal case was
dismissed.133 This result does not coincide with the PLRA's
intended goal of promoting judicial efficiency because the net
result requires Hicks to re-file the same case for a second
examination of the merits.
C. Barring Meritorious Claims
Beside being a waste of time, it may not seem significant
that a prisoner-litigant must re-file his claim after dismissal for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. However, the delay
of certain prisoner claims may in effect be a denial of relief.
Prisoners seek both monetary damages and injunctive relief in a
§1983 claim.134 If a prisoner is only seeking injunctive relief,
time is of the essence for this prisoner. During the time-frame in
which relief is delayed, it is actually a denial of relief because the
abuse continues. Among the most frequently alleged violations
of the Eighth Amendment is the denial of adequate medical
care. 35  Prisoners who are denied medical treatment after
seeking such treatment for months or years "will file a civil
rights action in desperation" to obtain it.136 To mandate that
such prisoner wait until the exhaustion requirement and
litigation are complete to receive medical attention is in effect a
denial of relief.
In some instances, a prisoner's claim may be precluded all
together if the statute of limitations for the § 1983 claim expires
while the prisoner was exhausting his administrative remedies.
Federal courts apply the statute of limitations of the relevant
states for § 1983 claims, 137 and the different state statutes of
132 Id. at *2.
133 Id. at *2 n.1, 3.
134 See Turner, supra note 12, at 623-24 (1979) (stating that in some states
more prisoners sued for injunctive relief, while in others they sued for monetary
relief).
135 See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 439 ("One of the greatest areas of prisoner
complaints in federal court is inadequate medical care.").
136 Id. at 440.
137 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (noting that federal courts
borrow the relevant state's statute of limitations for § 1983 claims).
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limitations for such claims range from one year to three years.138
Many courts have held that the statute of limitations is tolled
while a prisoner-litigant is exhausting his administrative
remedies, 139 but there are still those courts that have not
addressed the issue, leaving the status of the prisoner's claims
unclear.140 Given the complex nature of certain grievance
procedures and the relatively short statute of limitations,
prisoner-litigants with meritorious claims can be precluded from
ever bringing suit. Not even proponents of the PLRA wanted to
bar meritorious claims, 41 and Congress did not intend for the
PLRA to bar such claims.
The mandatory nature of the exhaustion requirement also
bars meritorious claims in situations where the grievance
procedure is not clearly established. For instance, the penal
institution may not have a delineated grievance procedure.
Therefore, prisoners may not be able to exhaust the remedies
because they will not know how to proceed administratively and
instead will file suit. In response, defendants will raise non-
exhaustion as a basis for dismissal and thereby preclude relief
for a meritorious claim. A sound example of this potential abuse
is Aldridge v. Gill,142 in which Samuel Aldridge, a pro se
prisoner, filed a claim under § 1983 seeking money damages
against the Judge Executive of McCracken County, Kentucky
and several prison officials at the McCracken County Regional
138 See, e.g., Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that
plaintiffs § 1983 claims for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights are governed
by Texas' two-year statute of limitations); Hayes v. N.Y.S. D.O.C. Officers, No. 97
Civ. 7383 MBM, 1998 WL 901730, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1998) (stating that in
New York, the relevant statute of limitations is three years from the date on which
the action accrued).
139 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Holmes, 963 F.2d 799, 805 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding
that, in a prisoner civil rights suit, the Texas statute of limitations was tolled while
the prisoner exhausted administrative remedies); Howard v. Snyder, No. 01-376-
SLR, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9084, at *4 (D. Del. May 14, 2002) (concluding that
exhaustion of administrative remedies tolled the statute of limitations for the
prisoner's § 1983 claim).
140 See, e.g., Leal v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001)
(declining to decide in the first instance whether the exhaustion requirement under
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) would operate to toll the statute of limitations).
141 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S14627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) ("Indeed, I do not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate
claims. This legislation will not prevent those claims from being raised. The
legislation will, however, go far in preventing inmates from abusing the Federal
judicial system.").
142 47 Fed. Appx. 751 (6th Cir. 2002).
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Jail for alleged constitutional violations. 143 The district court
entered judgment in favor of the defendants because the plaintiff
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 144 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that it was unclear
whether administrative remedies were even "available" because
plaintiff alleged that he was never informed of a grievance
process, and defendants merely asserted that a grievance
procedure existed without ever substantiating to the district
court what this process entailed. Thus, the district court never
resolved this matter. 145 The district court's holding is especially
troubling in light of the merits of Aldridge's case, which
prompted an investigation by the federal civil rights division,
which confirmed that his claim was in fact meritorious. 146
The Aldridge decision indicates that prisoner litigation can
be meritorious and that the exhaustion requirement makes it
unnecessarily difficult to obtain relief. Although Aldridge could
simply re-file his case, he would first have to determine how to
exhaust grievance procedures that were unclear and
unsubstantiated, possibly precluding him from filing a future
claim.1 47 If there was no grievance procedure, Aldridge could re-
file his claim based on the argument that there was no available
administrative procedure, but the success of this argument
depends on which party has the burden of proving exhaustion.
Courts disagree over who has the burden of raising the issue
of whether exhaustion has been fulfilled. Some courts hold that
143 The complaint, dated January 18, 2000, alleged that
1) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [the plaintiffs] serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment; 2) the defendants
violated his right of access to the courts in violation of the First
Amendment; 3) [plaintiff] was housed in a segregation cell for fourteenth
months without reason and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;
and 4) [plaintiff] was kept at the jail in excess of the state statutory time
limit before being transferred to a state prison.
Id. at 751-52.
144 See id. at 752(noting that the complaint was also untimely).
146 See id. at 752-53 (finding that the deficiencies in the grievance process
"prompted an investigation by the United States Department of Justice and a
settlement agreement").
146 Id. at 753 (" 'Eventually, Plaintiff was successful in convincing the federal
civil rights division to investigate his allegations. In November, 1998 and January,
1999, Mr. Lee toured the MCRJ to investigate the deplorable conditions there...
Mr. Lee confirmed that the complaints were meritorious .... ' (quoting Aldridge in
his requests for administrative relief)).
147 See id. at 752 (noting that the circuit court remanded the case for inquiry
into whether there was a grievance procedure available).
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plaintiffs have the burden of pleading that exhaustion has been
completed, 148 while other courts hold that the exhaustion
requirement is an affirmative defense to be raised by defendants
and is therefore waiveable. 149 The difference between the two
approaches is significant. A plaintiff who has the burden of
proving that the exhaustion requirement has been satisfied is
subject to sua sponte dismissal if the court finds this burden has
not been met. In a jurisdiction where the requirement is an
affirmative defense, however, if the defendant fails to raise the
issue, a prisoner's case can bypass the exhaustion requirement
and proceed regardless of whether the prisoner has in fact
utilized all available administrative remedies. This difference in
interpretation of the exhaustion requirement effectively provides
for two very different treatments of a prisoner's suit and of the
statutory provision itself. The Supreme Court has not resolved
this split, so in the interim, it will be subject to more speculation
and rationalization by the different courts.
Aldridge also highlights the issue, discussed above, of
whether exhausting administrative remedies tolls the statute of
limitation for a § 1983 claim. In Aldridge, the circuit court
remanded the case for consideration of whether exhaustion had
tolled Aldridge's federal claim. 150 Thus, not only did Aldridge
have to wait to exhaust his administrative remedies and then re-
file the suit, but he also faced the possibility of never getting his
day in court if the statute of limitations expired.151 The
procedural hurdles imposed by the exhaustion requirement may
also preclude meritorious claims because, by the time the
148 See Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that
prisoners need to plead claims with specificity and show that they have exhausted
administrative remedies); Fisher v. Wickstrom, No. 00-1162, 2000 WL 1477232, at
*1 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2000) (indicating that before the court will address any claim
set forth in the plaintiffs complaint, it must be shown that the plaintiff complied
with the exhaustion requirement and if any complaint contains both exhausted and
unexhausted claims, the court "may address the merits of the exhausted claims and
dismiss only those that are unexhausted"); Simpson v. Gallant, 231 F. Supp. 2d 341,
350-51 (D. Me. 2002) (noting that Simpson, the prisoner, had "adequately pled
exhaustion").
149 See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 293, 295 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the
Second, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. circuits have also so held). The Kertes court found
that it is easier for prison officials to show that the prisoner has not exhausted all
avenues since they have access to the necessary documents. Id. at 295.
150 Aldridge, 47 Fed. Appx. at 753.
151 See id. at 752-53 (noting that the "statute of limitations is tolled [only]
during the time the prisoner pursues administrative remedies").
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prisoner's case is dismissed by a federal court and he figures out
there is a grievance procedure, the prisoner may simply give
up. 152
The purpose of the PLRA, and its policy implementation
through procedural devices such as the exhaustion requirement,
was not to bar meritorious claims. Senator Hatch, a staunch
supporter of the PLRA, explicitly stated that "[i]ndeed, I do not
want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims. This
legislation will not prevent those claims from being raised. The
legislation will, however, go far in preventing inmates from
abusing the [f]ederal judicial system."'153 Despite this admission,
the exhaustion requirement does not distinguish between
meritorious claims and unmeritorious claims; instead, it broadly
covers all prisoner lawsuits.154  Moreover, the effect of the
mandatory exhaustion requirement is to inhibit both meritless
and legitimate claims.
D. The Institution's Right to Address Prison Problems Before
Litigation
The exhaustion requirement was also intended to serve as
notice for the prisons and to give such institutions the
opportunity to redress their inmates' concerns thereby
minimizing the need for litigation. 155 There are times, however,
when this goal is outweighed by the need for judicial relief. This
need is particularly apparent in situations of systemic abuse of
prisoners, because the constitutional violations are so
widespread that the institutions are already put on notice of the
situation prior to the commencement of any litigation. 156 In a
152 See Mendez v. Artuz, 01 Civ. 4157(GEL), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3263, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2002) (recognizing that the procedural hurdles for a prisoner's
complaint may discourage and tire a plaintiff).
153 141 CONG. REC. S14627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
154 See Winslow, supra note 41, at 1678-80 (indicating that the physical injury
requirement serves to bar meritorious claims because they are based on emotional
or mental claims).
155 See Kuzinski, supra note 53, at 381 (noting that mandating inmates to turn
first to less expensive methods of resolution, such as institutional grievance
procedures, may increase chances that simple disputes may be resolved without
involving litigation).
156 See, e.g., Noguera v. Hasty, 99 Civ. 8786 (KMW)(AJP), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11956, at *8-12 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2000) (detailing the sexual abuse of
prison inmates and indicating that prison officials, including the warden, were
aware of the conduct).
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situation of overt abuse of prisoners by prison officials, this
interest cannot prevail over a prisoner's injuries because the
nature and frequency of abuse suffices to put prison
administrators on notice that they should take action. 157
IV. THE SOLUTION
The problems posed by the exhaustion requirement can be
easily remedied by giving judges discretion over what constitutes
exhaustion under specified guidelines. A judge should be
allowed to forego the requirement in the following situations: (1)
if the case has already been dismissed based on the merits; (2) if
administrative remedies are fully exhausted during the pending
lawsuit; and (3) if there is a time-sensitive claim alleging
violation of a constitutional right, in which it is clear that
administrative procedures would not be able to provide relief.
The imposition of a mandatory exhaustion requirement in these
instances would be contrary to legislative intent. This solution is
not mandating a radical departure from the current state of the
provision but is merely asserting a "fine-tweaking" of some of its
weaknesses.
To impose a mandatory exhaustion requirement on all
prisoner litigation may deter some frivolous claims, but this
minimal gain is obtained at the cost of closing out the only
available forum for prisoners who suffer egregious abuse at the
hands of their keepers. In light of the guarantees of the Eighth
Amendment, closing the federal courts as a forum in order to
improve efficiency, while allowing prisoners to be abused, is not
a sound trade-off.
Furthermore, because the PLRA was enacted based on
certain misconceived notions about prisoner litigation, it cannot
serve its intended purpose of weeding out frivolous claims, nor of
lightening the federal workload.158 More importantly, it has the
effect of barring potentially meritorious claims, which it
explicitly was not supposed to do. The proposed solution to the
problems associated with the exhaustion requirement under the
PLRA is to do away with the mandatory nature of the provision
157 See id. at *8-9, *36-37 (stating that, although the inmate did not follow
formal grievance procedures, her oral and written complaints put both the
institution and the Bureau of Prisons in Washington on notice regarding the sexual
abuse).
158 Herman, supra note 9, at 1231.
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and to give judges discretion. The shifting of power is important
because judges are familiar with the specific facts of a claim and
are in the best position to make a judgment over whether or not
exhaustion would serve any purpose. Judges can discern a
meritorious claim from one that is frivolous, but a mandatory
exhaustion requirement cannot do the same.
To grant judges discretion under limited circumstances does
not undermine the goals of the PLRA. Furthermore, judges'
personal interests are aligned with the goal of the PLRA because
they are the ones who have to deal with frivolous lawsuits that
consume their workload.
CONCLUSION
Although this Note deals solely with the question of whether
a procedural device is as effective as it can be, it does not ignore
the fact that the substantive nature of certain prisoners' claims
warrants attention. Pervasive abuse of prisoners continues
despite constitutional guarantees, and efforts to promote
superficial guarantees of judicial efficiency have chipped away at
these constitutional protections. The right of access to the courts
is a fundamental right for the average citizen, but this right is
even more important to incarcerated individuals. For prisoners,
the courts are the sole forum for the vindication of their retained
rights.
The exhaustion requirement may be precluding more than
cases like the Peanut Butter Case. It may be silencing and
destroying one of the only avenues of relief that a prisoner may
have. As one commentator has noted:
The inmate, a classic 'deviant' whom the modern state
separates, isolates, and controls absolutely, must seek relief
from non-traditional quarters. Even more so than other
political minorities for whom some measure of progress has
been made in improving accountability and influence, the
courts remain for these despised individuals "the sole practical
avenue open to ... petition for redress of grievances."159
According to Keith Ploladian, a New York State inmate, "in
the bleak world of prison, being able to sue is one of the few ways
159 See Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-
Government Expression: A Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L.
REV. 835, 896 (2002) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963)).
[Vol.78:203
2004] DOING AWAY WITH MORE THAN PEANUT BUTTER 231
for prisoners to exert some control over their environment. It
gives [prisoners] a way to be heard... Without this, you might
as well pull out the bullwhip and go back to the ball and
chain."1 60 For prisoners, prison litigation may be the sole outlet
they have left to redress their grievances. Angry prisoners who
feel hopeless about the situation they face in prison have no
incentive to comply with rules of the institution. To allow
prisoners to retain the right to sue over aspects of prison life may
also be beneficial to the maintenance of some degree of order and
civility in prisons.
160 See Dunn, supra note 21.
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